## STATE OF ILLINOIS ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION

Commonwealth	Edison	Company
--------------	--------	---------

Docket No. 00-0259

Petition for expedited approval of implementation of a market based

implementation of a market-based alternative tariff, to become effective on or before May 1, 2000, pursuant to

Article IX and Section 16-112 of the

Public Utilities Act

(cons.)

Central Illinois Public Service Company

Union Electric Company

Docket No. 00-0395

Petition for approval of revisions to

market value tariff, Rider MV

Illinois Power Company

Docket No. 00-0461

Proposed new Rider MVI and

Revisions to Rider TC

Joint Direct Testimony on Re-Opening Of

PHILIP R. O'CONNOR

and

TOM BRAMSCHREIBER

On Behalf Of

**AES NEWENERGY, INC.** 

**FEBRUARY 16, 2001** 

## New Energy 5 - Consequence 31

Date 2-27-01 Reporter CB

1	Q.	Please state your names and business address.
2	A.	Philip R. O'Connor and Tom Bramschreiber. AES NewEnergy, Inc., 309 West
3		Washington Street, Suite 1100, Chicago, Illinois 60606.
4		
5	Q.	Are you the same Dr. O'Connor and Mr. Bramschreiber who previously
6		testified in the instant proceeding?
7	A.	Yes. We do note that Mr. Bramschreiber has recently taken a temporary
8		assignment within AES Great Plains, Inc., a different business unit within AES.
9		
10	Q.	What is the purpose of this phase of the proceeding?
11	A.	Based upon the recent action of the Illinois Commerce Commission
12		("Commission") to grant the motions for additional hearings that were filed by
13		AES NewEnergy and the Illinois Industrial Energy Consumers ("IIEC"); it is our
14		understanding that the purpose of this phase of the proceeding is three-fold.
15		First, Commonwealth Edison Company ("Edison"); Central Illinois
16		Public Service Company and Union Electric Company ("Ameren"); and
17		Illinois Power Company ("Illinois Power"), collectively referred to as "the
18		Utilities" have been requested to provide evidence regarding the prices at
19		which they have sold off-peak power and energy during the past twelve
20		(12) months to determine if any adjustment to day-ahead off-peak spot
21		transactions is appropriate. Second, the Commission has requested that
22		additional evidence be taken regarding the optionality adjustments utilized

by the Utilities themselves in the wholesale marketplace to properly

23

### AES NewEnergy Re-Opening Exhibit No. \_\_

1		account for the value of serving an uncertain load. Third, the
2		Commission is interested in examining the impact on Edison's proposal of
3		Bloomberg PowerMatch removing the Into ComEd trading screen.
4		
5	Q.	What is the purpose of your joint testimony on re-opening?
6	A.	The purpose of our joint testimony is to discuss (i) the impact of Bloomberg
7		removing the Into ComEd trading screen; and (ii) the dramatic "skyrocketing" in
8		off-peak spot market prices which undermines the very foundation of Edison's
9		original proposal with respect to off-peak market values. Although our testimony
10		focuses primarily on Edison, the content generally applies to the three market
11		index proposals offered by the Utilities.
12		
13		NewEnergy-sponsored witness Daniel J. Somers of Ernst & Young will discuss
14		issues related to the optionality adjustment that is needed to properly account for
15		the value of serving an uncertain load.
16		
17	Q.	Should the outcome of this proceeding result in Market Value Index ("MVI")
18		tariffs being approved on a permanent basis?
19	A.	No. As discussed further below, electricity markets throughout the nation are
20		experiencing constant and continual changes. Past market performance is not a
21		reliable indicator of future market performance. For this reason, it is imperative
22		for the Commission to maintain jurisdiction over the MVI tariffs by requiring that

		AES NewEnergy Re-Opening Exhibit No
1		the tariffs be filed on an interim basis or limiting the effectiveness to at least a
2		twelve (12) month period but in no event longer than twenty-four (24) months.
3		
4	Q.	Please describe what has recently occurred with respect to the original data
5		sources relied upon by Edison for the calculation of on-peak and off-peak
6		market prices.
7	A.	As the development of wholesale markets and the sources of wholesale market
8		data have continued to evolve in recent months, the three original data sources for
9		calculation of Edison's on-peak and off-peak market prices have endured
10		dramatic changes. This is true even over the short three-month period since the
11		record was closed in the initial phase of this proceeding.

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

First, on November 21, 2000, Edison notified the parties within this proceeding that the Into ComEd trading screen was being removed from Bloomberg PowerMatch due to lack of sufficient trading activity. **Second**, on December 4, 2000, an article appeared on Page 1 of McGraw-Hill Energy's Power Markets Week which bore the headline, "Traders See Altrade, Bloomberg Losing Ground In Crowded Online Trading Arena." Third, the November 20, 2000, issue of Power Markets Week, published the week Reply Briefs were filed in the initial phase of this proceeding, showed no off-peak activity for the Into ComEd spot market for the entire reporting period (i.e., no transactions reported for the entire weekday period of November 13th through the 17th). All told, the thinness and

### AES NewEnergy Re-Opening Exhibit No. \_\_\_

et was dramatically
However, we would
ndicated that Edison
Ed data in its market
ested in the Hearing
equate explanation of
s preferred source of
the Into ComEd on-
of the fundamental
Exchanges
of this proceeding
•
that trading on the
that trading on the (See Edison witness
J

## AES NewEnergy Re-Opening Exhibit No. \_\_\_

1		Bloomberg PowerMatch so much so that Bloomberg chose to remove the Into
2		ComEd hub from its reporting service due to lack of sufficient trading activity.
3		
4	Q.	With respect to the Altrade Power Exchange, is the Into ComEd trading
5		screen still actively traded?
6	A.	While the trading screen is still active, the amount of activity that occurs via the
7		screen is ambiguous. The Page 1 article that appeared in the December 4, 2000,
8		issue of Power Markets Week stated, in part:
9 10 11 12 13 14 15		"Online power trading platforms backed by large marketers appear to have dealt a blow to two once-strong independent platforms, according to a large number of traders, in the battle for dominance in the fragmented online trading business [T]raders report that liquidity is drying up on the platforms operated by Altrade Power Exchange and Bloomberg's PowerMatch."
16		Representatives of Altrade and Bloomberg (whose subjectivity is self-evident)
17		dispute the trader's perceptions, but even Edison, the major proponent of these
18		forums, acknowledges that apparently there has been a slow down in trading
19		activity. Edison witness Mr. Nichols acknowledges that "there has been a general
20		downturn in trading volume during the end of 2000." The recent volatility and
21		higher electricity prices experienced throughout the nation have resulted in many
22		traders, including NewEnergy's traders, relying more on bi-lateral and personal
23		relationship transactions as opposed to electronic exchange transactions.

1	Q.	Based upon the apparent reduction in trading activity for the Into ComEd
2		hub, does NewEnergy still support Edison's proposal to use an Into ComEd
3		methodology for establishing monthly on-peak forward market prices (e.g.,
4		Altrade Power Exchange)?
5	A.	Yes. For the Edison market only, an Into ComEd on-peak data source is more
6		appropriate than an Into Cinergy on-peak data source plus a basis or location
7		adjustment. Instead of agreeing to modify its data hierarchy to minimize the risk
8		of manipulation, Edison has now proposed to completely abandon the Into
9		ComEd market as the basis for the calculation of the on-peak forward market
10		values. The Commission should reject Edison's ill-conceived abandonment of its
11		original position for two independent reasons:
12		(1) Use of the Into Cinergy electronic exchange for developing on-peak
13		market values for Edison is not supported by the record; and
14		(2) Abandonment of the Into ComEd electronic exchange at this time will
15		forever retard the development of a competitive market in the Edison
16		service territory.
17		
18		The Proposed Order accurately recognized that Section 16-112(m) appears to
19		allow Edison and the other utilities to reject Commission proposed modifications
20		to a market index tariff, in favor of a return to the NFF process. However, the
21		fear of a return to the NFF should not form the basis to provide Edison with an
22		option to abandon its proposal; especially given that the proposed modification is

23

designed to reduce the potential for manipulation. Affording Edison such an

### AES NewEnergy Re-Opening Exhibit No. \_\_

1		option sends inappropriate signals, provides perverse incentives for the Utilities to
2		stonewall and sandbag, and is an improper manner for the Commission to set
3		public policy.
4		
5		It is in the best interest of consumers and the development of a competitive
6		market for a robust trading hub to develop in northern Illinois. If Edison
7		abandons its original Into ComEd proposal, such a robust trading hub will not
8		develop.
9		
10		That point aside, if the Commission were to accept Edison's eleventh-hour switch
11		to an Into Cinergy on-peak forward market data source, the Commission should
12		adopt Staff's proposed multiplicative basis adjustment to account for the
13		locational difference between the two markets.
14		
15	Q.	Does NewEnergy still support the use of electronic exchanges for determining
16		monthly on-peak forward market prices?
17	A.	Yes. Although it still remains too early to tell which electronic trading platforms
18		will ever develop beyond their current levels or even survive into the future. The
19		data sources of monthly on-peak forward market prices must continue to be
20		monitored by the Commission, with appropriate changes made when warranted.

- Q. How should the Commission continue to monitor the use of electronic trading exchanges?
- A. At the very least, the Commission should limit the effectiveness of the proposed

  MVI tariffs to at least a twelve (12) month period but in no event longer than

  twenty-four (24) months.

6

7

## /

Q.

9

11

1

]4

l

J

J

2

2b

.

#### **Off-Peak Transactions**

- With respect to off-peak trading for the Into ComEd delivery point, what is the implication of no off-peak spot transactions being reported for an entire week?
- A. The lack of reported off-peak spot transactions for an entire week provides a clear indication that **no one** relies, in whole or in part, on day-ahead off-peak spot transactions to serve their day-to-day load requirements (e.g., not NewEnergy, not any other alternative retail electric supplier ("ARES"), and not the Utilities themselves). Moreover, the lack of reported off-peak spot transactions for an entire week also provides a clear indication that the Utilities do not rely on this market to "resell" the amount of freed-up power and energy made available when retail customers move to ARES'.

Contrary to Edison's contention that it is perfectly reasonable for an ARES to rely on day-ahead off-peak spot purchases to serve daily load requirements, the routine lack of reported off-peak transactions indicates that absolutely no one who is active in the market believes Edison's assertion, including Edison itself. Edison's actions speak much louder than its words.

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

2

Reliance on daily spot transactions, to serve firm contractual retail load commitments when availability and price are not known with any certainty in advance, would be operationally and economically speculative. NewEnergy operates in the Edison market as a load following entity - - not an entity who speculates on the availability or price of power and energy. All indications are that Edison serves its native load in much the same fashion.

10

 $\Pi$ 

12

13

Moreover, as discussed more fully below, recent market activity has shown that historical off-peak spot market prices do not provide a reasonable proxy for future off-peak market prices.

14

15

16 .

23

December.

## Q. What recent developments have occurred in the day-ahead off-peak spot market?

17 A. There has been a stark and dramatic change in off-peak spot prices over the past
18 few months. A number of factors, including higher prices for natural gas and
19 increased costs related to emissions compliance, have resulted in day-ahead off20 peak spot prices skyrocketing over historical levels. By way of comparison,
21 Edison's current Applicable Period A Market Value Index incorporates a monthly
22 off-peak market price of approximately \$13 per megawatt-hour for the month of

(This figure is the simple average of day-ahead off-peak spot)

transactions reported in <u>Power Markets Week</u> for the next regular weekday during
the month of December of 1999.) In contrast, this approximately \$13 per
megawatt-hour rate increases to approximately \$30 per megawatt-hour when the
same calculation is performed for the month of December of 2000. This is a

130% increase from December 1999 to December 2000. In addition, individual
weekdays in December of 2000 ranged from \$17 to \$52 per megawatt-hour, with
the daily low being more than 30% above the prior December's monthly average
(\$17 daily low price in December of 2000 versus \$13 monthly average price in
December of 1999).

Α.

## Q. What impact should the recent skyrocketing of off-peak prices have upon this proceeding?

This recent and continuing change in off-peak spot market prices emphasizes the need to have a reasonable "sunset" provision requirement as part of any MVI tariff. As seen in California, electricity markets change quickly and abruptly and a reasonable sunset provision provides one form of safeguard to help achieve the General Assembly's stated intention in the Act "to facilitate the development of competition for generation services". (See 220 ILCS 5/16/109.)

# Q. What was Edison's position with respect to off-peak spot prices during the initial phase of this proceeding?

Mr. Huntowski testified on behalf of Edison that historical off-peak prices are a good proxy for future off-peak prices because they tend to be relatively stable

l over time. (See Edison witness Huntowski Rebuttal at 12.) That is the very foundation upon which Edison bases its off-peak market price determination. Recent developments in the off-peak spot market have shown Mr. Huntowski's 3 testimony to have been grossly inaccurate. Off-peak spot prices have not remained relatively stable over time - - not even over the short time since the 5 record was closed in the initial phase of this proceeding. 6 7 Where in the past NewEnergy received off-peak forward block quotes in the 8 upper-teens (e.g., \$15 - \$18 per megawatt-hour), we are now receiving such off-9 peak forward block quotes in the mid-twenties (e.g., \$23 - \$27 per megawatt-10 11 hour). 12 Q. Mr. Huntowski, who testified in the initial phase on behalf of Edison, has 13 14 contended that credit ratings effect the price at which buyers are able to acquire power and energy. Do you agree with this position? 15 A. No. The issue of credit is much more "black and white" than the "shades of gray" 16 suggested by Mr. Huntowski. Typically, before any exchange of pricing data 17 occurs, parties to a potential transaction must be preliminarily deemed credit-18 worthy by each other. If one party is unwilling to trade with the another, due to 19 past or existing credit concerns, price discussions are superfluous. Even if price 20 and terms are agreed upon in principal, a contract will only be executed after 21 22 minimum credit standards are further satisfied (e.g., posting collateral and/or

23

further reviewing the credit rating of the counter-party). In short, no credit results

in no contract; rather than Mr. Huntowski's suggestion that poor credit results in a higher price that incorporates some sort of credit risk premium.

It is not a matter, for example, of charging an extra dollar or two per megawatt-hour to lower credit-rated counter-parties. Either the buyer is likely to pay or the buyer is not likely to pay, and the price per unit does not impact that likelihood. Mr. Huntowski's analysis defies simple logic: if a counter-party is not likely to pay at \$35 per megawatt-hour, that counter-party is certainly not likely to pay at \$37 per megawatt-hour.

- Q. What is the result of the continued use of the Edison "average dump sale" methodology for calculating off-peak prices?
- A. The resulting market values will incorporate "stale" data that is two years old in some cases. For example, the index Edison proposes to calculate this spring will be in effect for the May of 2001 through April of 2002 period. Included in this Applicable Period A index will be "average dump sale" off-peak prices from April of 2000, a period some twenty-four months prior to the expiration of the index. Such stale data will not fully capture or reflect the recent changes in off-peak spot prices on a timely basis (i.e., historical data will always be trailing current information). As the Commission is aware, the use of stale data is one of the most often cited objections to the Neutral Fact Finder (NFF) method of determining market values.

#### Q. What is NewEnergy's position with respect to off-peak spot prices?

Edison's proposal for determining off-peak market prices improperly relies upon an artificial, unsupported, and inaccurate extrapolation of daily off-peak spot prices into longer-term forward market prices. The proposed methodology understates off-peak market prices by failing to reflect energy price premiums that are associated with longer-term off-peak energy contracts (*i.e.*, price and availability risk inherent in forward transactions). If one accepts Edison's methodology, then one has accepted the underlying premise that the average of daily spot transactions is equal to multi-day longer-term transactions. In other words, by accepting Edison's methodology, the Commission would be declaring that Edison is willing to commit its generation resources over multiple days at daily spot market-clearing prices, with no added premium for price and availability risk. The Utilities have not offered any evidence indicating that the simple average of day-ahead off-peak spot transactions are equal to multi-day off-peak forward transactions on a routine and continual basis.

Α.

A.

## Q. What evidence has been shown regarding off-peak forward transactions in the Into ComEd Market?

What has been shown is that day-ahead off-peak spot transactions are not reported by <u>Power Markets Week</u> on every weekday. For example, last month there were **no** off-peak spot transactions reported on January 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 17, 18, 30 and 31. This is a clear indication that no party relies on off-peak spot transactions to serve daily load requirements or to resell freed-up power and energy. Unlike the robust

## AES NewEnergy Re-Opening Exhibit No. \_\_

` <del>`</del>		
i l		Chicago city-gate natural gas market, where transactions are reported each and
2		every regular weekday, the Into ComEd off-peak electricity market is only
3		sporadically utilized (i.e., some days transactions are reported, other days no
4		transactions are reported).
5		
6	Q.	Can an ARES rely solely on day-ahead spot transactions as reported in
7		Power Markets Week to serve retail load?
8	A.	Edison's position with respect to this issue remains baffling. It is inconceivable
9		that an ARES who relies solely on day-alread off-peak spot transactions can
10		comply with the good faith scheduling requirement especially when such
11		transactions do not occur on every day.
12		
13		Whether scheduling using "load following service" or scheduling using the
14		subjective and loosely defined "Aztec Pyramid Method," scheduling nothing
15		during the off-peak hours on any day simply cannot result in good faith
16		scheduling for typical packages of aggregate retail load. Looking at the week
17		ending November 17, 2000, for example, there was not one single day in which
18	,	off-peak spot transactions were reported in Power Markets Week for the Into
19		ComEd delivery point (same for the week ending January 5, 2001).
	/	

Q. How would the lack of any reported off-peak spot transactions impact an ARES?

An ARES who relied solely on day-ahead off-peak spot transactions would have cheduled absolutely nothing for each weekday, thus resulting in the fulfillment of their entire load requirement through imbalance service. Edison cannot credibly assert that this is an acceptable way of procuring supply to meet retail customer load requirements. It is simply illogical for Edison to argue that scheduling nothing can satisfy any definition of good faith scheduling. The bottom line is that no ARES is behaving according to the Edison theory. Day-ahead off-peak spot transactions, which have not occurred on every regular weekday, do not provide a source of supply that will permit satisfaction of the good faith scheduling requirement. While an ARES may have relied on off-peak "dump sales" to satisfy some portion of its load requirement from day-to-day, other supply arrangements must have been in place to provide sufficient energy to meet retail customer load requirements.

Α.

### Q. How does this impact Edison's proposal?

To the extent that an ARES must also rely on the hourly spot market, multi-day off-peak forward purchases, or round-the-clock forward purchases to augment its supply portfolio, there has been no evidence whatsoever offered to date that the resulting cost will be equal to the "average dump sale" method Edison has proposed. If one were to accept such a premise, then one would need to accept that hourly spot transactions, day-ahead spot transactions, and multi-day forward

transactions are all priced and valued the same during off-peak hours (i.e., average of day-ahead spot transactions are representative of all off-peak weekday transactions). There has been no evidence submitted that supports this premise.

- Q. How does NewEnergy propose that the Commission should calculate the offpeak market values?
- A. There are two separate questions that need to be answered with respect to off-peak market values. First, Edison should be required to verify whether the simple average of day-ahead off-peak spot transactions has been reflective of multi-day off-peak forward transactions on a routine and continual basis. Second, it should be determined whether historical off-peak spot prices are a good proxy for future off-peak forward prices. The former is historical in nature, the latter is prospective in nature.

- How should the Commission determine if the simple average of day-ahead off-peak spot transactions have been reflective of multi-day off-peak forward transactions?
  - A. At a minimum, the Commission should review the actual prices at which the Utilities have sold off-peak power and energy in short and long-term transactions during the past twelve (12) months. It is our understanding that Edison has provided such information on a confidential basis to the Staff and the Attorney General. Particular focus should be placed on whether day-ahead off-peak spot transactions are reflective of multi-day off-peak forward transactions on a routine

and continual basis. By calculating the monthly volume-weighted average of all multi-day off-peak transactions less than 30-days in duration, a comparison to the monthly average of day-ahead spot transactions as published in <a href="Power Market">Power Market</a>
Week for the same calendar month can be made. Only after such a comparison is made can the validity of Edison's position that the average of day-ahead off-peak spot transactions is equal to multi-day off-peak transactions be assessed.

7

8

9

6

2

3

4

5

- Q. How should the Commission determine if historical off-peak spot prices are a good proxy for future off-peak forward prices?
- 10 A. The Commission should rely upon use of the market survey or broker quote
  11 -system to determine this answer.

12

- 13 Q. How do you propose that the Commission engage in such an exercise?
- 14 A. On or about the time the Market Value is being calculated, the Commission Staff 15 or an independent third-party should confact various suppliers seeking an indication of off-peak forward market prices for the period corresponding to the 16 effective period of the applicable index (e.g., twelve months ending April of 17 18 2002). The suppliers contacted should include brokers and marketers, as well as the wholesale trading unit or affiliate of Ameren, Edison, and Illinois Power. 19 20 With respect to the Utilities, a verified or sworn statement from a top utility representative should also be required that states the range of off-peak prices at 21 22 which blocks of power and energy are being offered (i.e., range in which the 23 Utilities or its affiliates are willing to sell off-peak power and energy).

1	Q.	What type of third-party entities are you referring to?
2	A.	There are a number of independent third-parties that already gather similar data
3		from market participants, including Megawatt Daily or Power Markets Week.
4		Additionally, the Commission Staff may wish to solicit recommendations from
5		the Utilities and ARES for other entities or suppliers that should be included on
6		the list
7		
8	Q.	What should be the focus of this process?
9	A.	Particular focus should again be placed on whether historical day-ahead off-peak
10		spot transactions are reflective of off-peak forward transactions on a routine and
11		continual basis.
12		
13	Q.	Please explain how you are recommending that this market survey or broker
14		quote system be conducted?
15	A.	We recommend that the following five (5) steps be followed:
16		(1) determine period for which forward off-peak prices are desired
17		(e.g., Period A or Period B);
18		(2) draft a Request for Proposal seeking off-peak forward market
19		quotes for the desired period (proposal can be drafted with input of
20		parties represented in this proceeding to elicit maximum response
21		level);
22		(3) contact a number of brokers and marketers (perhaps as many as a
23		dozen) requesting bids and offers for desired time period (survey

		should include Cinergy and PJM markets to provide maximum
2		response level);
3		(4) eliminate the high and low responses, and average the remaining
4		responses; and
5		(5) compare average of remaining responses to off-peak block prices
6		embedded in the Utilities methodology (per unit rate for one
7		megawatt in each wholesale off-peak hour).
8	,	
9		Only after such a comparison is made can the validity of Edison's position that
10	ŕ	the average of historical day-ahead off-peak spot transactions is equal to multi-
11		day off-peak transaction be assessed.
12		
13	Q.	Given the various recent developments in the Illinois retail electric market,
14		and the issue being addressed on re-opening, do you have an opinion
15		regarding the effectiveness of the proposed MVI tariffs?
16		
17	A.	Yes. There have been a number of recent developments that warrant limiting the
18		effectiveness of the proposed MVI tariffs to at least a twelve (12) month period
19		but in no event longer than twenty-four (24) months. Some of these recent
20		developments include:
21		(1) the decrease in trading on Bloomberg and Altrade;
22 23 24		(2) the termination of the Into ComEd screen from Bloomberg;
25 26 27		(3) the indication at the last minute by Edison that, after having heavily promoted the "Into ComEd" market index that it is prepared to acquiesce to the substitution of the Into Cinergy index without explanation for their shift;

## AES NewEnergy Re-Opening Exhibit No.

$\begin{vmatrix} 1 \\ 2 \\ 3 \end{vmatrix}$	(4) the substantial changes in off-peak price levels and volatility compared to historical patterns;
4 5 6 7	(5) the rather obvious lack of an adjustment to account for the costs associated with serving uncertain load, that is load that is different than historical patterns;
8 9	(6) a vast reduction in the number of retail customers exercising choice in the Edison service territory; and
10 11 12	(7) the generally unsettled conditions in electric deregulation.
13	
14	All of these recent developments should be cause for serious concern by the
15	Commission. The problems inherent in turning over any future changes or non-
16	changes in the MVI to the unitateral determination of the utilities should be self-
17	evident. The Commission should retain continuing oversight and jurisdiction
18	over the MVI tariffs in order to continue to steer the future course of Illinois'
19	transition to competition in the electric industry.
20	
21	The MVI tariffs should be approved for at least a one-year period but in no event
22	longer than twenty-four (24) months with workshops and monitoring efforts
23	immediately initiated. A lack of monitoring of the market was a major factor in
24	the California Public Utility Commission not adequately being prepared and
25	informed to prevent the well-documented adverse developments in that state.

1	Please su	mmarize your recommendations.
2	A. Th	ne Commission should:
3	1	Maintain jurisdiction over the MVI tariffs by requiring that the tariffs be filed
4		on an interim basis or limiting the effectiveness to at least a one-year period
5		but in no event longer than twenty-four (24) months given the various recent
6		developments in the Illinois retail electric market;
7	•	Review the actual prices at which the Utilities have sold off-peak power and
8		energy in short and long-term transactions during the past twelve (12) months.
9.		Particular focus should be placed on whether day-ahead off-peak spot
10		transactions are reflective of multi-day off-peak forward transactions on a
11		routine and continual basis;
2	•	Utilize a market survey or broker quote system to determine it historical off-
13		peak spot prices are a good proxy for future off-peak forward prices.
14		
1.5 (	0 De	and that conclude your testimone?

16 A. Yes.

## STATE OF ILLINOIS ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION

Commonwealth Edison	Company
---------------------	---------

Docket No. 00-0259

Petition for expedited approval of

implementation of a market-based

alternative tariff, to become effective on or before May 1, 2000, pursuant to

Article IX and Section 16-112 of the

Public Utilities Act

(cons.)

Central Illinois Public Service Company

Union Electric Company

Docket No. 00-0395

Petition for approval of revisions to

market value tariff, Rider MV

:

Illinois Power Company

Docket No. 00-0461

Proposed new Rider MVI and

Revisions to Rider TC

#### AFFIDAVIT OF PHILIP R. O'CONNOR, PH.D. AND TOM BRAMSCHREIBER

STATE OF ILLINOIS )
SS
COUNTY OF COOK )

PHILIP R. O'CONNOR, PH.D., and TOM BRAMSCHREIBER, being duly sworn, state as follows:

- 1. All facts stated in the Joint Direct testimony on Re-Opening in the abovereferenced proceeding are based solely upon their personal knowledge and experiences.
- 2. If called to testify, they would state that Philip R. O'Connor is President of AES NewEnergy, Inc. His office is located at 309 W. Washington Street, Suite 1100, Chicago, Illinois 60606.
- 3. If called to testify, they would state that Tom Bramschreiber has recently taken a temporary assignment as a Project Director with AES Great Plains, Inc., a different business unit within AES. His office is located at 1901 Butterfield Road, Suite 650, Downers Grove, Illinois 60515.

- If they were called to testify and asked the same questions contained in the joint 4. direct testimony on re-opening, they would give the same answers contained therein.
- If called to testify, they would state that the information contained in the joint 5. direct testimony on re-opening is true and correct to the best of their knowledge, information and belief.
- 6. Further Affiants sayeth not.

Dated this  $6^{th}$  day of March, 2001.

Philip R. O'Connor

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 6<sup>th</sup> day of March, 2001.

Notary

**ROBIN BROWN-EVANS** COMMISSION EXPIRES: 10/29/04